Prison Abolition in the UK: They Dare Not Speak Its Name?

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The prison population in England and Wales currently ranks among the highest in Western Europe. It has increased by over 30 percent compared to 10 years ago, and is nearly double that of 20 years ago (Mills and Roberts 2012; Ministry of Justice 2013). This has occurred at a time when crime rates in the UK, as in many other Western democracies, have been falling (Roberts et al. 2003), and when there is sustained pressure on all governments to reduce public expenditures. Despite these population trends, and intense fiscal pressures, successive conservative and Labour governments in the UK have gone out of their way to reassure the public that they will continue to provide places for all those convicted by the courts and given a prison sentence. Private corporations, several with existing facilities in the United States and Australia, have been engaged to assist with managing the consequences of this commitment, including the financing and running of new prisons. Delivering pain is now big business in liberal market economies.

With the exception of a single year, during the last decade prisoner numbers have increased steadily also in Scotland (Berman 2012). Northern Ireland is the only jurisdiction to have experienced a slight fall in numbers, down 2 percent in 2009 (Northern Ireland Executive Research and Statistical Bulletin 2010). According to this source, the rates of imprisonment per 100,000 in the UK were as follows: 153 in England and Wales, 152 in Scotland, and 88 in Northern Ireland. Although rising, the rates of imprisonment within the UK jurisdictions remain well below the United States, where the figure during the same period was 629.

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It was against this unpromising background that in 2007 an article cowritten by one of the authors of this piece challenged the enduring place of imprisonment in the UK (Ryan and Sim 2007). The article argued that the prison had achieved almost “hegemonic status,” making its function impregnable to serious criticism, and that its critics were represented either as whimsical idealists or as outmoded 1960s political radicals inspired by US West Coast activists like Angela Davis (2003), whose antics were undermining the efforts of more sensible penal lobbyists still wedded to the agenda of prison reform. It is important to acknowledge the need to deconstruct this crude neoliberal caricature that seeks to place prison abolition alongside other unmentionable aspirations, such as social equality. However, in what follows we set aside contemporary critics of prison abolition, briefly sketch the origins of the UK movement, explore its inner tensions and tactical dilemmas, and assess its contemporary relevance.

**Origins and Platform**

The modern demand for prison abolition in the UK was promoted by Radical Alternatives to Prison (RAP), a small pressure group that formally came into being on the strong breeze of the counterculture in 1970. This was a direct response to the imprisonment of antinuclear protestors engaged in highly publicized acts of civil disobedience in prominent public spaces (such as Trafalgar Square) under the banner of CND and its Committee of 100. Although RAP later became involved in complex debates about the social utility and philosophical justifications of punishment per se, the group’s original campaigning message was essentially simple and practical.

The modern prison, RAP argued, has clearly failed as a vehicle for reforming offenders and therefore should be abolished. Instead of imprisonment, offenders should be sentenced to less expensive but constructive alternatives to prison that could, in most cases, be situated in their local communities and managed by local people (Ryan 1978). Ideally, prison sentences would be negotiated and, whenever possible, entered into voluntarily. Like the American Friends Service Committee (1971), RAP was not in favor of state-imposed punishments or therapies where they could be avoided. It was hoped that recidivism rates for those serving such relatively cheap community sentences would be lower than the rates for those who previously had spent time in prison—though the new penal apparatus was not to be judged purely by such dry utilitarian criteria.

RAP was not shy in emphasizing how its abolitionist credentials marked it out from others in the penal lobby, including the newly emergent prisoners’ union, PROP (Preservation of the Rights of Prisoners). This had come into being following a series of disturbances in local prisons in England and Wales in 1972. With ex-prisoners firmly in the driving seat, PROP issued a comprehensive Charter of Rights, demanding, among other things, that PROP be recognized as a regular trade union to negotiate improvements in prison pay and conditions (Fitzgerald 1977). Though sympathetic to PROP’s demands, RAP emphasized that it was not
interested in improving prison conditions; rather, it was working for prison abolition. RAP complained that a penal commentator, usually well informed, had “failed to realize that RAP and PROP have very different aims and ideas.” It continued:

PROP has much more short-term reformist goals, with the improvement of the prisoner’s lot as its chief objective. Abolition and alternatives to prison are often thrown in as an after-thought, but many of their members seem to believe that prisons are an inevitable part of the social system. RAP’s main aim is the total abolition of the prison structure … alternatives would be based on much greater community participation and would also encompass radical changes in … society. (Cited in Ryan 1978, 113)

RAP’s need to reaffirm its unique credentials was less pressing, or less necessary, in relation to the penal lobby’s most influential organization at this time—the Howard League. Established in the 1860s and named in honor of the Quaker founder of the modern prison, John Howard, the League had perpetuated the myth that prison regimes could be modified to secure the reform of prisoners. For over a century it had championed what Foucault described as a “monotonous” round of inefficacious reforms (Foucault 1977). The rejection of this failed reform agenda and its commitment to prison abolition set RAP directly and firmly at odds with the one lobby group that had access to the prison service.

**Strategies and Interventions**

RAP’s determination to have no involvement with prison reform and its fear of being drawn onto the reformers’ ground and risking incorporation (Mathiesen 1974; see also Burton and Carlen 1979) was the subject of much internal debate within the group. It was also the subject of much criticism. The director of the Howard League, for example, argued that whereas prison abolition might be achievable in the long term, there was a humanitarian case for supporting reforms, including some proposed by PROP, that would improve the lives of prisoners in the short term.

This argument was not without merit and it was with some relief, as Stan Cohen (1980) put it—borrowing perhaps from André Gorz (1967)—that Thomas Mathiesen (1974), working with the Norwegian prisoners’ movement KROM, proposed that abolitionists draw a distinction between positive and negative reforms. The distinction was between reforms that supported the prison system and those that, in the long term, would lead to its abolition. A yardstick for intervention or engagement was thus established. This enabled RAP to campaign against the employment of more prison psychiatrists who would simply reinforce the rehabilitation “myth,” while arguing for an end to prison censorship. The latter opened communication between prisons and the outside world, revealing regimes of brutal warehousing.

There was also a protracted debate about the possibility of RAP organizing alternatives to prison. Those opposing this proposition were concerned that such
programs would necessarily involve elements of coercion. Others considered whether there was sufficient space to develop a radical contribution, and their view prevailed. The most well-known and researched of these projects was London’s Newham Alternatives Project (NAP), which provided an opportunity for offenders on a deferred sentence to deal with their problems in the community rather than being locked in prison. Through the court probation service, RAP interviewed potential clients, confirmed that they would receive a prison sentence, and, having secured their consent, provided a modest range of support services via a Newham shop front. The initiative achieved reasonable results, but the probation service and local magistrates were suspicious of NAP’s sometimes unorthodox approaches, and the program was eventually abandoned (Dronfield 1980).

This was not a defeat for developing effective alternatives. Radical activists who seek space to challenge dominant values or practices are often outmaneuvered, or the contextual circumstances change, so that “cutting and running” becomes the only appropriate option. Further, some reforms encompass both negative and positive elements, and consequently tactical retreats are required. The abolitionists’ position is always dynamic, its program of resistance forever “unfinished” (Mathiesen 1974).²

**Different Voices**

In addition to the differences with the Howard League, there was a political edge to RAP’s critique of prisons that was unpalatable to the mainstream penal lobby. The group suggested that prisons, and the criminal justice system, were instrumental in securing and sustaining an unequal society, reflecting the interests of the economically powerful. RAP’s critique of Holloway, London’s iconic women’s prison that at the time was being remodelled and re-marketed as a “secure hospital,” was unequivocal:

> Underlying the plan for a new Holloway (and other new and bigger prisons) is the unquestioned acceptance of the whole superstructure of the law, the courts, the police, the definition of who is “criminal,” in a word, of “Justice.” The whole process of labelling a person as criminal, of which prison is but a small but important part, is taken for granted. It is very important to see that the definition of certain kinds of acquisitiveness and violence as commendable, reflects and perpetuates the vested interests and inequalities of power, wealth and status that have characterised British society … through powerful landowners and ruthless industrialists until today. The law, its substance and its application, are rooted in the inequalities of the past. (Cited in Ryan 1978, 107)

This blunt materialist critique, with its invitation to view the entire criminal justice system as a mechanism securing and maintaining inequalities rather than detached from harsh social and economic realities, were not to the Howard League’s liking. It was the domain of radical politics that rejected liberal penal reform. The
League was anxious that RAP’s abolitionist focus moved from the narrow site of imprisonment to a radical critique of newly emerging forms of state-sponsored community services. These, RAP argued, reflected bourgeois values, and the new sentences failed to challenge the foundations of the UK’s divided and unequal society (Ryan 1978).

However, as Ruggiero (2010, 9) observes, “abolitionism does not possess one single theoretical or political source of inspiration, but a composite backdrop from which wittingly or otherwise, it draws its arguments and proposals for action.” In this regard it is important to note that RAP’s activists came to abolitionism through diverse routes, not always focused on the prison and owing less to the Left politics of the early Thomas Mathiesen. There were many in the mainstream of British politics sympathetic to the ideas of Herman Bianchi (1986), Louk Hulsman (1991), and Nils Christie (1982), who challenged the moral legitimacy of punishment itself and the modern practice of settling routine disputes by handing them to distant criminal justice professionals. For Christie, this constituted a major theft of conflicts; people and their communities, he argued, should be given back what was rightfully theirs. The issues raised by these writers—maybe moralists would be the best collective description—lacked an obvious political economy. At least one, Louk Hulsman, was a committed Christian whose voice enriched the debate and strengthened the lobby for prison abolition, and several of RAP’s more active members were Quakers. There were many different voices, as will be discussed later.

It is also important to establish that debates about the legitimacy and purpose of the modern prison and the shape of the wider criminal justice system occurred in the UK at a time when the Prison Service was under considerable pressure. In English prisons this was the result of widespread protests coordinated by PROP in the 1970s and of the retaliatory industrial action taken by the POA (Prison Officers Association) (Fitzgerald 1977). These protests continued in Scottish prisons well into the 1980s, supported by activists at the Gateway Exchange and by Jimmy Boyle in particular, whose experience as a lifer in the Barlinnie Special Unit attracted international attention (Boyle 1977). In contrast to politically and racially aware groups such as the Californian Prisoners Union and the San Francisco Prisoners Union, these UK prisoners’ voices were not always focused directly on the politics of abolition (Fitzgerald 1977). Their politics appeared less vibrant, but the stories they told broke the secrecy surrounding UK prisons to reveal a catalogue of violent and corrupt practices engaged in by the authorities that informed the public that the reform agenda might be fiction (Scraton, Sim, and Skidmore 1991; Sim 2010). The demand for an end to secrecy and greater accountability grew (Cohen and Taylor 1978).

Impact and Legacy

What follows assesses the impact of the UK campaign to secure prison abolition and its legacy. At first glance this task appears straightforward. Prisons have endured and, as stated earlier, the overall UK prison population continues to exceed record
levels, with a continuing commitment to prisons feeding off and into penal populism (Pratt 2007; Ryan 2003). This plays on heightened feelings of insecurity among the middle classes (Garland 2001), which in turn encourages still higher levels of social exclusion (Young 1999). This suggests that the campaign for prison abolition was an abject failure.

Such a “bottom line” judgment, however, would be harsh, not least because it fails to register that the campaign undermined the universal popular and political support for prisons. Abolitionists successfully challenged the official story that prisons were concerned primarily with reform. A contrary story, according to which prisons were places of punishment and/or containment, became more widely accepted, even by the Howard League and the 1985 May Report into UK prisons (Ryan 2003). When Conservative Home Secretary (later to be party leader) Michael Howard delighted his supporters in the 1990s by proclaiming that “prison works,” he was clearly emphasizing its role as an institution for containment and punishment, not reform. Yet civil servants continued to reformulate prison service mission statements without jettisoning a commitment to positive outcomes; for a time, “humane containment” became the preferred phrase. But RAP set the record straight, and old-style prison reformers grew increasingly isolated.

It may appear an irony to suggest that UK abolitionists succeeded in helping to marginalize prison reform, but the effects of political interventions are seldom predictable, as the consequences of radical critiques of psychiatry also illustrate (see Sedgwick 1982). Further, it was a significant political success to have contributed to the polarization between the “prison works” lobby and the mainstream liberal position stating that the UK’s extensive (and expanding) criminal justice and penal apparatus is largely irrelevant to tackling the real problems labeled as “crime.”

Abolitionists also reinjected politics into penal reform, identifying the prison as one of a series of disciplinary institutions at the disposal of the state to rule and discipline the working classes. As noted earlier, this critique was at first delivered as a crude reductionist incantation, but RAP activists engaged with groups such as Women Against Rape and formed alliances with militant antiracist groups campaigning against the criminal justice system. Thus it became clear that disciplinary power in modern societies was not exercised solely by a dominant class, or a class fraction in control of the state, but also by men over women, white people over black people. These often complex relationships could not be explained only in economic or class terms (Ryan and Ward 1992). Although the exercise of social discipline is the outcrop of highly complex social processes, it remains clearly evident that UK prisons house the poor and the dispossessed. Abolitionists deserve credit for emphasizing the material, political, and ideological realities underpinning imprisonment.

A countercharge of naivety has been laid at the abolitionists’ door, particularly with respect to RAP’s over-optimistic 1970s view that alternative sentences would be administered only to those offenders destined for prison, thus helping to reduce
prison numbers. It became quickly evident that the opposite was happening. There was little change in the profile of those going to prison, whereas alternative sentences such as community service were given to people who previously would not have been considered for prison and would have been fined or discharged. This punitive net-widening in fact expanded the disciplinary field, an outcome neither intended nor foreseen (Cohen 1985; see also Centre for Criminal Justice Studies 2011).

To anticipate this outcome, let alone guard against it, was not in RAP’s power. Other tactical choices were. For example, RAP wasted time and energy debating how a minority of very dangerous or difficult offenders could be dealt with in the community, when it might have been more productive to embrace neo-abolitionist or minimalist positions that reluctantly accept that such offenders have to be imprisoned (Roberts 2007). Pat Carlen, for example, has argued that with the exception of a few, most women offenders could be accommodated in the community. Her position was positively accepted and credible, although it compromised a “total” abolitionist perspective (Carlen 1990).

The abolitionist campaign’s objective of abolishing prisons was audacious, although its constructive, tactical interventions were limited. What it achieved through RAP and PROP was to expose the simple truth that UK prisons were brutal warehouses and that prison reform was dead.

Penal Abolition, Restorative Justice, and Criminal Law

This final section focuses on other abolitionist voices found particularly, but not exclusively, in Europe. Here the concentrated effort has been on challenging the moral authority of criminal law, shifting the focus on the need to remodel, or even dismantle, the existing criminal justice system rather than simply to attack prisons. Do these debates have practical or theoretical resonance in the UK?

It is important to note that penal abolitionism, or something close, is a significant element within the restorative justice movement, which, as its name suggests, seeks to return the resolution of disputes to the communities rather than to rely on state-sponsored punishment. Influenced by, among others, European abolitionists, the UK restorative justice movement began in the 1980s with “standalone” experiments, until it was formally (though modestly) incorporated into UK legal practice through the Youth and Criminal Evidence Act of 1999 (Faulkner 2001; McLaughlin et al. 2003).

It is beyond the scope of this article to offer a critical assessment of restorative justice practices in the UK (see Johnstone 2011); it would also be a very difficult task, given the diversity of projects and the differences between the rhetoric of restorative justice and its workaday realities. Ruggiero (2010, 195) sums up some of the dangers that restorative justice projects face: cooptation and professionalization (by which conflicts are once again “stolen” from their protagonists); succumbing to a market-based logic by which compensatory processes become mere negotiations of the price to be paid for infringements of property rights; and making compensation or restorative measures more onerous than conventional punishments would be. The
latter is not necessarily a criticism of restorative justice, for abolitionists object to the futility of punishment and do not expect that all wrongdoers will be let off lightly. Indeed, a potential weakness of restorative justice highlighted in a case study by Zernova (2007) is that professionals may be so reluctant to be incorporated into a sanctioning process that they neglect the principle that restorative justice should focus on the victim, and not on “kindness” to the perpetrator as an end in itself.

Beyond inspiring these, as yet modest, practical innovations in the UK, abolitionism also continues to make its presence felt in criminal law theory. Such theoretical debates should not be dismissed as irrelevant to practice. Theories of criminal law underpin the intellectual development of future generations of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers. Critical analyses that question the purpose and legitimacy of criminal law have the potential to contribute toward a “politics of bad conscience” (de Haan 1990, ch. 4), thus making the contraction of penal systems possible.

Two strands of penal abolitionism remain important in debates about criminal law—the “social justice critique” and the “restorative justice critique” (Johnstone and Ward, 2010). The “social justice critique” advances two main points: first, that those processed by the criminal justice system are overwhelmingly poor and powerless individuals, yet they are not those who cause the greatest social harm (Hillyard and Tombs 2007); second, that the social injustice and exclusion endured by these individuals calls into question the moral right of the state to punish them. As criminal law theorist Antony Duff concedes, these criticisms constitute a powerful case for “contingent abolitionism”—the claim that “punishment as practised in our own societies cannot be justified” (Duff 2001, 31). Duff stops just short of embracing contingent abolitionism: “The conclusion must be that our present practices of punishment are, if not wholly unjustified, very largely unjustified” (ibid., 197).

What Duff refers to as “absolute abolitionism” develops a restorative justice critique of criminal law—positing that state punishment neither addresses the needs of the victim nor enters into genuine moral communication with the offender. What follows from this position is the abolition of state punishment. Duff accepts the critique, but rejects penal abolition on the ground that punishment can be restorative (2001, 34). The proposition here is that punishment (mainly, but not exclusively, non-custodial punishment) can offer a form of communication that conveys the community’s moral censure of the offender while (ideally) communicating the offender’s repentance—or, failing that, a kind of ritual apology—to the community. But Duff argues that this is only justifiable for offenders who are members of a liberal community and would not extend to the socially excluded individuals so often targeted for punishment. Thus, Duff’s position leads to a “politics of bad conscience” in a similar vein to abolitionism, although his penal utopia looks rather different.

Duff’s notion of restorative punishment as a form of secular penance is reminiscent of Christie’s willingness to accept a form of punishment that he describes as analogous to mourning (Christie 1982, 98–105). The two views are
not identical, as Christie considers punishment as expressing the anger of those directly affected—i.e., mourning expresses the sorrow of the bereaved rather than that of a political community. Yet both are non-utilitarian accounts that focus on the expressive meaning of punishment and construct punishment as restorative. This may simply indicate that Christie is a neo-abolitionist or minimalist rather than an “absolute abolitionist,” but Duff’s “absolute abolitionist” is something of a straw man.

These philosophical issues cannot be pursued in any detail here. The important point is that although Duff is not the only voice in British criminal law theory, it is clear that a view close to abolitionism is well within the mainstream of legal scholarship. Therefore, in legal academia at least, abolitionism cannot be dismissed as a whimsical ideal with nothing relevant to contribute. In fact, abolitionism has a great deal to contribute to critical thinking about criminal law, and particular attention should be given—especially as it was neglected in Ruggiero’s survey of the field—to the Habermasian variety of abolitionism developed by Willem de Haan (1990). It is beyond the scope of this article to summarize Habermas’s intricate and evolving theories of communicative action and law (for an unusually succinct and clear exposition, see Habermas 1999). Suffice it to say that Habermas shares with both abolitionism and Duff’s type of criminal law theory a concern with processes of moral communication and with the importance of fair procedures in resolving conflicts and clarifying norms. What abolitionism contributes to this analysis is an awareness of how the bureaucratic administration of pain distorts the communicative ideals that, in certain respects, common-law criminal procedure embodies (Sanders, Young, and Burton 2010; Johnstone and Ward 2010, ch. 7). Plea bargaining, the relegation of many defendants to the role of “dummy player” (Carlen 1976, 98), and the incentives to lie, to assassinate the character of one’s accuser, or to feign remorse undermine any value criminal procedure might offer as a way of articulating values and defending rights. Abolitionism in a Habermasian vein points toward a form of justice more attuned to the “lifeworld” of everyday social meaning, and it constitutes an attempt to adapt and apply legal principles to take account of all participants’ understandings of the situation.

Habermas, however, also cautions against the “deformalization” of law and the idea that negotiated settlements can replace the criminal trial (Habermas 1986, 232). This is a major problem for the restorative justice movement. To the extent that its proposals have been implemented, the movement has been co-opted into a strategy of diversion eroding the procedural safeguards of the criminal justice system (Ashworth and Zedner 2008, 25). As Faulkner (2006, 160) observes, “No satisfactory means have so far been found of dealing restoratively with cases where the facts are in dispute.” The pressure on alleged offenders to accept restorative procedures risks being merely a variant of common-law criminal procedure’s great betrayal of its own ideals, the coerced guilty plea. The feeling that criminal justice, for all its faults, embodies a degree of procedural rationality that needs to be strongly defended
against further erosion is the greatest obstacle to a wholehearted endorsement of an abolitionist view (Johnstone and Ward 2010, 191–92). Abolitionism, however, may be able to meet this challenge by further refining a broadly Habermasian approach.

**Conclusion**

That abolitionism is alive and well in British academia can hardly be doubted after the publication of Joe Sim’s *Punishment and Prisons* (2009) and Vincenzo Ruggiero’s *Penal Abolitionism* (2010). Both are major contributions to critical penology written from explicitly abolitionist standpoints. The prospects of abolitionism as a social movement driving change, however, seem much less secure. The group No More Prisons, whose manifesto Sim (2009, 61) enthusiastically quotes, was sadly short-lived, and although groups promoting restorative justice have made modest headway, as has been indicated, there should be no doubt that criminal justice operates in the UK in a form consistent with its much criticized past. The organizations Women in Prison (womeninprison.org.uk) and INQUEST (inquest.org.uk), though not explicitly committed to prison abolition, emerged from the abolitionist milieu of the early 1980s and are flourishing three decades later. Is this because of or despite their links with abolitionism?

A trite answer to the question is that it all depends on how abolitionism is defined. Abolitionism today does not suggest a rigid commitment to the abolition of punishment or prisons. Sim, for example, states clearly that his position “does not mean dismantling the walls of the prison and releasing into the community those men who have been caught and sentenced for serious crimes of violence against women” (Sim 2009, 159). As Sim notes elsewhere, RAP had been quite clear on that point in the early 1980s (1994, 269–70). What Sim’s abolitionism does involve is a critical response to “the role of the prison as it is presently constructed and constituted in the policing and regulation of dangerous individuals” (Sim 2009, 159). But Sim denies that he is just another reformer who wishes prisons to be constructed and constituted differently. For him, prison reformers are those in pursuit of an unrealistic utopia, “the oxymoron that is the ideally reformed prison” (ibid., 192). He argues, however, that it is a mistake to dismiss practical politics as antithetical to the pursuit of utopian dreams. The abolitionist dream is a combination of penal and social change that will be complete only when prisons are no longer required because other practices have replaced state punishment and confinement, and because gender-based, racial, and other forms of violence have been tackled at their social and ideological roots. This is a dream that can give inspiration and direction to practical politics because, although that utopia remains distant, there is a clear understanding of progress toward it: “Utopian thinking drives incremental improvements” (Russell Jacoby, quoted in Sim 2009, 162).

Sim’s notion of utopia is typical of those who claim to be abolitionists or neo-abolitionists. Without denying the importance of Sim’s argument, utopian dreaming is not the central or defining feature of present-day UK abolitionism.
Rather, its two central features are: first, it continues to draw on and develop the abolitionist tradition of social thought celebrated by Ruggiero (2010), with Bianchi, Christie, Hulsman, and Mathiesen among its central figures; second, it is committed to what Ruggiero (ibid., 206–9) calls a public sociology that fights alongside socially excluded individuals and groups, rather than merely asking policymakers to be nicer in dealing with them. This is where Women in Prison, INQUEST, and other similar groups (Scott 2009) make their distinctive contribution in assisting prisoners, ex-prisoners, and those bereaved by deaths in prison to have their voices heard in civil society. This is a process to which criminologists—whether or not they care, or dare, to call themselves abolitionists—still have much to contribute. Yet the continuing existence of these groups, and of the critical traditions that are sustained in practice, depends on ensuring that the wider alliances formed are sufficient to mobilize the desire for widespread social and political change. This was the impetus that secured a serious hearing for abolitionism in Western Europe in the 1970s. Without generating something equally powerful, we will continue talking to ourselves while the prison system relentlessly expands.

NOTES

1. Mick Ryan joined RAP’s governing Nucleus in 1977. Tony Ward worked for RAP from 1980 to 1982 and remained active until it faded away (it was never formally dissolved) in the late 1980s. He was effectively the managing editor of RAP’s journal, The Abolitionist, with Mick Ryan and Joe Sim serving as members of its editorial collective. Mike Nellis suggested the title of The Abolitionist.

2. Mathiesen was in regular contact with RAP in the 1970s and worked closely with other prisoner movements in Sweden (KRUM) and Denmark (KRIM). He was also a founding member of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control.

3. John Moore, of the University of West of England and the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control, was the driving force behind the creation of No More Prisons.

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